Restitution - Constructive Trust Relief for Breach of Oral Contract to Create Trust in Land by Manuel, Edward A., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 4 
1957 
Restitution - Constructive Trust Relief for Breach of Oral Contract 
to Create Trust in Land 
Edward A. Manuel S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Contracts Commons, Estates and Trusts Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, and the 
Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Edward A. Manuel S.Ed., Restitution - Constructive Trust Relief for Breach of Oral Contract to Create Trust 
in Land, 55 MICH. L. REV. 608 (1957). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/16 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
608 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 55 
REsnTUTION-CoNsTRuCT1VE TRUST RELIEF FOR BREACH OF ORAL CoN-
TRACT To CREATE TRUST IN LAND-Plaintiff mining company sued to im-
pose a constructive trust on mineral interests purchased by the defendant 
employee in breach of his oral agreement with the company. The agreement 
included a promise to hold any property so acquired in trust for the em-
ployer at his election. Ruling that this agreement was unenforceable under 
the Oklahoma statute of frauds, the trial court relied on the defendant's 
status as an ordinary employee without duties relating to the acquisition 
of mineral interests or access to confidential information, and gave judg-
ment for the defendant. On appeal, held, affirmed. Without proof of pos-
itive fraud or breach of fiduciary duty, the breach of an oral agreement to 
hold land in trust does not give rise to a constructive trust. Amerada 
Petroleum Corporation v. Burline, (10th Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 862. 
A constructive trust has been defined as the "formula through which the 
c;onscience of equity finds expression."1 In cases involving the statute of 
frauds the chancellor should require more than the breach of an unenforce-
able contract before he allows his conscience to trouble him.2 The English 
courts look for unjust enrichment as the only prerequisite to constructive 
trust relief.8 The accident that the constructive trust as a restitutionary 
remedy in practical effect affords relief which often conforms to the actual 
intent of the parties, especially in the simple A-to-B in trust for A situation, 
1 Cardozo, J., in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380 at !186, 122 
N.E. 378 (1919). 
2 To do otherwise would completely ignore the statutory mandate. See 2 CORBIN, 
CONTRACfS §401, p. 373 (1950). 
3 In re Duke of Marlborough, 2 Ch. 133 (1894). In Bannister v. Bannister, 2 All 
E. R. 13!1 (1948), a widow sold real estate for a reduced price in return for a promised 
life beneficial interest in part of the premises. The court imposed a constructive trust 
on this portion to prevent the defendant from being unjustly enriched by his retention 
of the consideration received for the breached agreement, i.e., the excess between the 
value of the premises and the price paid which was assumed to be equivalent to the 
value of the life beneficial interest. Some American courts have seemed to adopt a similar 
approach. See 1 Scorr, TRUSTS, 2d ed., §44, p. 308 (1956). In Oklahoma the resulting 
trust concept is utilized to allow the introduction of parol evidence to show that the 
beneficial interest was not conveyed along with the legal estate in unenforceable express 
trust situations. Thus the grantor is treated as the person who has furnished the con-
sideration for a purchase money resulting trust. See Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Okla. 268, 
205 P. (2d) 314 (1949). 
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should not be regarded as fatal.' It is so regarded, however, in the majority 
of American jurisdictions.5 These courts hold that unless jurisdiction 
can be based upon traditional equitable grounds, such as fraud or breach 
of fiduciary duty, the policy of the statute of frauds prevents equitable 
intervention in this type of case. 6 Having thus foreclosed resort to this 
relatively simple restitutionary approach, the American courts have devel-
oped the enigmatic doctrine of confidential relationship. 7 This doctrine is 
widely used to justify constructive trust relief in unenforceable oral trust 
cases, and as outlined by some courts it embraces practically every case en-
compassed by the English rule. 8 Because of its emphasis on the relationship 
of the parties and on the requisite of confidence which its name implies, 
this doctrine might be defined as a constructive fiduciary relationship. 
Current theories of constructive fraud, involving as they do an admixture 
of fraud, undue influence, duress, and often a question of mental capacity, 
are not foreign to the concepts underlying the confidential relationship 
doctrine.0 In fact, the confidential relationship doctrine is often explained 
in terms of presumed fraud or undue influence.10 The doctrine is but a 
shorthand reference to a host of confused equitable concepts, and their ag-
gregation into one doctrine compounds the confusion. In view of this it 
is not surprising to hear the chancellor accused of fitting his rules to his 
chosen results.11 The result in the principal case, however, seems to be 
beyond reproach. Because the situation presents at most only a doubtful 
case of unjust enrichment, a denial of constructive trust relief cannot be 
attacked on this ground. In this connection probably the closest analogy is 
the unenforceable oral promise of a land vendee. In these cases the courts 
4 For a clarification of the difference between restitution and enforcement see Ames, 
"Constructive Trusts Based Upon the Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land," 20 
HARV. L. REv. 549 (1907). 
IS Rasdall's Administrators v. Rasdall, 9 Wis. 379 (1859); Silvers v. Howard, 106 Kan. 
762, 190 P. I (1920); I Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §44, p. 310 (1956). 
6 Sacre v. Sacre, 143 Me. 80, 55 A. (2d) 592 (1947); I Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §40, 
p. 293 (1956). 
7 Becker v. Neurath, 149 Ky. 421, 149 S.W. 857 (1912); Klein v. Klein, 112 N.Y.S. 
(2d) 546 (1952); 35 A.L.R. 280 (1925); REsnTUTION REsrATEMENT §182 (1936). 
s Seeberger v. Seeberger, 325 Ill. 47 at 51, 155 N .E. 763 (1927); Bogert, "Confidential 
Relations and Unenforceable Express Trusts," 13 CoRN. L. Q. 237 (1928). The broad scope 
of the language used by courts when applying this rule is noted in Trossbach v. Tross-
bach, 185 Md. 47 at 52, 42 A. (2d) 905 (1945), where it is stated, "Indeed, unless limited 
by the context, the general statement that a constructive trust arises under circumstances 
which render it inequitable for the holder of the legal title to retain it may be broader 
and less exacting than the English rule." Thus, under the confidential relation doctrine, 
a constructive trust has been imposed to protect a third party beneficiary of an unenforce-
able oral trust. See Huffine v. Lincoln, 52 Mont. 585, 160 P. 820 (1916). 
o See Rozell v. Vansyckle, 11 Wash. 79, 39 P. 270 (1895); Harrington v. Schiller, 231 
N.Y. 278, 132 N.E. 89 (1921); Green, "Fraud, Undue Influence, and Mental Incompetency," 
43 COL. L. REv. 176 (1943); and 23 AM. JUR., Fraud and Deceit §14 (1939). 
10 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2503 (1940); Scott, "Conveyances Upon Trusts 
Not Properly Declared," 37 HARv. L. REv. 653 (1924); 3 BOGERT, TRusrs AND TRUSTEES 
§496, p. 209 (1946). 
11 See I Scorr, TRusrs, 2d ed., §44.3 (1956), for an example. 
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commonly permit return of the consideration received as the measure of 
unjust enrichment.12 In the principal case, the defendant is enrichei only 
to the extent of the amount paid for the broken promise. This amount is 
difficult to ascertain since this promise entered only remotely, if at all, into 
the negotiation of the defendant's contract of employment.18 There is ad-
mittedly no mistake, actual fraud, or fiduciary relationship involved, and 
the court cannot be criticized for refusing to extend the confidential rela-
tionship doctrine to an ordinary employment situation without proof of 
the factual existence of such a relationship.14 
Edward A. Manuel, S. Ed. 
12 Turner v. White, 329 Mass. 549, 109 N.E. (2d) 155 (1952); 3 BOGERT, TRusrs AND 
TRUSTEES §479 (1946). 
13 Although this point was not discussed in the case, it seems highly probable that 
the employment contract was supported only by the normal and ordinary consideration 
paid for the type of services rendered by the defendant. The defendant had not, there-
fore, been enriched at all. See principal case at 866. 
14 Renshaw v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 87 Utah 364, 49 P. (2d) 403 (1935), and 
Guedry v. Jordan, (Tex. Civ. App. 1924) 268 S.W. 191, support the proposition that there 
is no confidential relationship inherent in the ordinary employment situation as to matters 
not within the scope of the employee's duties. See 100 A.L.R. 872 (1936). 
